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This article explores the consequences of modernization on the policy-making 
processes of a singular National Sport Organization: Athletics Canada. In drawing 
upon the works of Green and Houlihan (2005) as a baseline comparison, we examine 
how the organizations’ policy-making processes have changed over a 10-year period 
(2002-2012). Specifically, our analysis focuses on the nature and extent of these intra-
organizational policy-related changes and how they have influenced the 
organization’s decision-making capabilities. The descriptive analysis is informed by 
empirical data collected from eight in-depth semi-structured interviews with senior 
Athletics Canada personnel and concentrates on three inter-related themes (i) the 
development and prioritization of Own the Podium funded policies and programs; 
and (ii) the development and prioritization of evidence-based policies and programs, 
which, in turn, has resulted in (iii) increased inter-organizational relationship strain 
between Athletics Canada and its key delivery partners. More broadly, our 
investigation contributes to recent amateur sport scholarship that has sought to 
better understand how these broader socio-political shifts have influenced the 
specific decision-making processes of sport organizations. 
 
he examination of organizational 
change and reform has been a 
central thread to discussions 
surrounding amateur sport. Scholars have 
drawn upon a raft of theoretical 
perspectives and concepts in order to 
understand and explain the nature and 
extent of change evident within amateur 
sport organizations. These include, but are 
not limited to, commercialization (e.g., 
T 
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Slack, 2004), professionalization (e.g., 
Thibault, Slack, & Hinings, 1991; 
Macintosh, Bedecki, & Franks, 1987; 
Macintosh & Whitson, 1990), and 
organizational and institutional theory (e.g., 
O’Brien & Slack, 2003, 2004; Kikulis, Slack, 
& Hinings, 1992; Washington & Patterson, 
2011). Sport policy scholars have also drawn 
upon a number of meso-level theoretical 
concepts to explain organizational and 
systemic change. These include policy 
communities and advocacy coalitions 
(Green, 2004; Green & Houlihan, 2005), 
lesson drawing and policy transfer (Green, 
2007), and path-dependency (Green & 
Collins, 2008). More recent discussions 
surrounding organization and systemic 
change have centred on more specific issues 
of corporate or organizational governance 
(e.g., Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007; Shilbury & 
Ferkins, 2011) and much broader concerns 
surrounding the modernization and the 
introduction of New Managerialism (NM) 
and New Public Management (NPM) into 
sport which are closely linked to what has 
collectively become known as the 
‘governance debate’ (Rhodes, 1996; for its 
application to sport see Goodwin & Grix, 
2011; Grix, 2010; Grix & Phillpots, 2011; 
Phillpots, Grix, & Quarmby, 2011). 
 Within the Canadian sport context, 
recent reform of the amateur sport 
landscape in general and National Sport 
Organizations (NSOs), the national level 
sport organizations responsible for 
governing over specific sports, in particular 
has been underpinned by two major, inter-
related developments. The first of which 
has been Canada’s successful bid to host the 
2010 Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver. 
The Vancouver Winter Olympic Games 
were the third Olympic Games to be hosted 
in Canada (previously Canada hosted the 
Montreal 1976 Summer Olympic Games 
and the Calgary 1988 Winter Olympic 
Games) with Canada having failed twice to 
win a single gold medal on home soil – the 
only host country in Olympic history to do 
so. In response to Canada’s successful bid 
and to ensure that Canada would achieve its 
target of first place on the podium at the 
2010 Olympic Winter Games and place top 
three at the 2010 Paralympic Winter Games 
(Priestner Allinger & Allinger, 2004), high 
performance stakeholders established a 
C$117 million technical program initiative 
entitled ‘Own the Podium 2010’ (OTP) 
(Priestner Allinger & Allinger, 2004). The 
following high performance stakeholders 
met in Calgary: Sport Canada, 
National/Multi-Sport Organisations, the 
Canadian Olympic Committee (COC), the 
Canadian Paralympic Committee (CPC), the 
Canadian Sport Centres/Institute Network, 
and WinSport Canada (previously the 
Canadian Olympic Delivery Authority) 
The initiative began in 2004, and was 
specifically designed to ensure that Canada 
had its most successful Olympic Games 
ever by “provid[ing] expertise and 
leadership to NSOs whose athletes are 
capable of winning medals at the 2010 
Winter Games” (OTP, n.d.b., p. 1). This 
unprecedented collaborative venture 
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resulted in the creation of Canada’s first 
ever agency for high performance sport.    
These developments (i.e. Vancouver 
2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic 
Games and the creation of OTP) have also 
been paralleled, and largely supported by, a 
substantial increase in federal government 
investment in high performance sport in 
recent years (De Bosscher, Bingham, Shibli, 
Van Bottenburg, & De Knop, 2006; Green 
& Houlihan, 2005; Grix & Carmichael, 
2012; Thibault & Harvey, 2013). Over the 
previous two summer Olympic 
quadrennials, for example, Canada has 
witnessed a doubling of federal government 
investment into Olympic summer sports 
programs from C$52,297,871 during the 
Beijing quadrennial to C$117,512,216 in the 
lead up to the London 2012 Games (OTP, 
n.d.a). This increased levels of investment 
have, however, resulted in increasing 
involvement of federal government in sport 
to ensure that taxpayer funding is well spent 
(Green & Houlihan, 2005; Thibault & 
Harvey, 2013). The implications of this 
increasing involvement of government in 
sport generally and Canadian sport 
specifically has been well documented 
(Green & Houlihan, 2005; Grix & 
Carmichael, 2012; Macintosh, Bedecki, & 
Franks, 1990; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; 
Thibault & Harvey, 2013).   
In light of the ongoing amateur sport-
related discussions surrounding 
organizational change and reform and the 
abovementioned major developments 
within Canadian sport, more research is 
required to understand how these recent 
developments – particularly federal 
government-related developments – have 
influenced amateur sport organizations in 
Canada. As Thibault and Harvey (2013) 
note, “contemporary analysis of 
government involvement in ‘amateur’ sport 
is not only warranted, it is essential given 
the significant changes that have occurred in 
Canadian sport” (Thibault & Harvey, 2013, 
p. 11). Hence, although previous 
scholarship has provided valuable 
contributions to our understanding of the 
nature and extent of these broader socio-
political shifts (e.g., modernization and 
governance), little is still known about the 
specific consequences of these broader 
shifts for sport organizations further down 
the delivery system (for exceptions within 
the UK context see Adams, 2011; Grix, 
2009). Questions that still remain 
unanswered within the Canadian sport 
context include, for example, how has 
Canada’s successful bid and subsequent 
hosting influenced sport organizations in 
Canada? Similarly, what influence (if any) 
has the creation of OTP had on sport 
organizations? As such, the purpose of this 
investigation is to explore the influence of 
these recent developments on the policy-
making processes of one NSO: Athletics 
Canada. To this end, we draw upon the 
discussions surrounding the modernization 
of sport and the insights generated from a 
singular case study of Athletics Canada to 
examine how the organizations’ policy-
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making processes have changed over a 10-
year period (2002-2012).  
 
Modernization and sport  
Many scholars have examined the 
impact of modernization within sport (cf. 
Adams, 2011; Green & Houlihan, 2005, 
2006; Grix, 2009; Grix & Parker, 2011; 
Houlihan & Green, 2009; Sam, 2009, 2011) 
even despite the concept’s lack of precision. 
This is not to suggest that the concept of 
modernization is meaningless. For 
Finlayson (2003), “modernisation appears to 
refer to a large scale sense of change, 
development and transformation, 
something different to what has come 
before” (p. 16). From this perspective, 
Finlayson (2003, p. 63) described 
modernization as an ‘up’ word that implies 
improvement, progression and change for 
the better. Houlihan and Green (2009, p. 
679) offer the closest articulation to a 
precise definition by referring to 
modernization as a particular set themes 
(e.g., responsiveness, managerialism, 
responsibilization), principles (e.g., 
partnership working), technologies (e.g., 
performance measurements such as 
benchmarking, public service agreements 
and auditing), and a narrative that has been 
used to frame and problematize the current 
‘state’ of public sector management. In this 
sense, modernization is a persistent aim of 
government agencies (Sam, 2009) that has 
come to be viewed as one of the many ways 
in which governments can shape (i.e. 
influence) and steer public sector 
organizations more generally and sport 
organizations specifically in order to achieve 
its own objectives.  
Houlihan and Green (2009) investigated 
the causes and consequences of 
modernization on two Non-Departmental 
Public Bodies (UK Sport and Sport 
England) within the United Kingdom. The 
authors found that modernization was 
primarily driven by central government, 
with some evidence of a perceived need for 
change within the two organizations. The 
consequences of modernization (i.e. reform) 
for these governmental agencies were 
greater decision-making constraints on 
professional staff, the marginalization of 
certain sporting interests, and the increasing 
adoption of business-like principles (e.g., 
evidence-based decision making and 
accountability measures). The latter (i.e. the 
adoption of business-like principles), in 
particular, had also resulted in a narrowing 
of organizational objectives – to a point that 
both organizations were increasingly 
adopting oversimplified strategic objectives. 
Of particular relevance to the present 
study are the works of Grix and colleagues 
(Grix, 2009; Grix & Parker, 2011). Grix 
(2009) examined the impact of 
modernization on UK Athletics, the NSO 
responsible for overseeing track and field 
athletics in the UK. The author argued that 
poor international level (i.e. world 
championships and Olympic/Paralympic 
Games) performances in the sport could, in 
part, be attributed to the way in which the 
NSO was governed. In drawing upon the 
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governance debate more broadly and the 
debates surrounding ‘New Managerialism’ 
specifically, Grix (2009) concludes that the 
values and practices imposed by central 
government – through its conditional 
funding agreements – effectively ‘strait-
jacketed’ the organization (UK Athletics) in 
its decision-making capabilities. More 
specifically, Grix’s (2009) analysis revealed, 
inter alia, that UK Athletics was 
characterized by key executive-level 
personnel turnover and an increasing focus 
on accountability up towards governmental 
agencies. According to Grix (2009), UK 
Athletics has also established a number of 
auditing technologies; most notably legally 
binding key performance indicators between 
UK Athletics and UK Sport. In a follow-up 
investigation, Grix and Parker (2011) built 
upon the findings of Grix’s UK Athletic 
case study to provide three explanations for 
the relative decline of Athletics within the 
UK. These explanations included: the poor 
governance of UK Athletics, broader 
social/societal change, and changes within 
school sport provision.     
In drawing upon the abovementioned 
policy-related scholarship (namely Green, 
Grix, and Houlihan), our investigation 
offers the following threefold contribution 
to the amateur sport literature. First, our 
investigation further explores the 
consequences of modernization within the 
Canadian sport context. As such, our study 
contributes an in-depth empirical case study 
to the small but growing body of literature 
that has examined the reforms of amateur 
sport organizations in recent years – 
specifically as they relate to the ongoing 
modernization process (e.g., Grix, 2009; 
Houlihan & Green, 2009). Second, and in 
building on previous scholarship, this 
investigation provides a more detailed 
understanding of how these broader socio-
political shifts (such as modernization) are 
influencing the specific decision-making 
processes of NSOs. Previous scholarship 
has adopted a broader analytical focus by 
attempting to examine and understand the 
nature of these socio-political influences on, 
for example, governmental agencies (e.g., 
Houlihan & Green, 2009; Sam, 2011) or to 
explain the overall decline of a particular 
sport (Grix & Parker, 2011) rather than 
focusing specifically on the consequences of 
such reforms on the managerial and 
decision-making practices of sport 
organizations further down the delivery 
chain (i.e. NSOs, clubs etc.). Third, and 
finally, this article provides an empirical case 
study analysis into the policy-making 
processes of one of Canada’s most 
prominent NSOs – Athletics Canada. 
Consequently we contribute an empirical 
insight for those interested in more specific 
discussions surrounding the national and 
international development of track and field 
athletics (henceforth athletics) (e.g., Grix, 
2009; Grix & Parker, 2011; Truyens, 
DeBosscher, Heyndels, & Westerbeek, 
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Rationale and Research Context 
The empirical data presented herein 
draws from the Canadian portion of a much 
larger, international study examining sport 
policy factors leading to international 
sporting success (or ‘SPLISS’) in the sport 
of Athletics (Truyens et al., 2014). This 
broader study (Truyens et al., 2014) was a 
sport-specific follow up investigation to 
examine the competitiveness of countries in 
the sport of athletics. More specifically, this 
follow-up study adapted the SPLISS 
framework developed by De Bosscher and 
colleagues (De Bosscher et al., 2006) in 
order to benchmark (i.e. compare) the 
development of countries across nine policy 
areas (or pillars) (see Table 1 for an 
overview of these policy-areas). A mixed 
methods approach was employed that 
involved interviewing key personnel and 
surveying coaches, athletes and clubs within 
the sport. The first phase of this broader 
research project involved the completion of 
an inventory that examined the ‘state of art’ 
of Athletics within Canada. Completion of 
this inventory required in-depth interviews 
with key personnel within athletics, 
particularly Athletics Canada. For the 
purposes of the present contribution, the 
researchers adopted a viewpoint similar to 
that provided by Eisenhardt (1989), who 
noted that “if a new line of thinking 
emerges during the research, it makes sense 
to take advantage… [of it] to provide a new 
theoretical insight” (p. 539). During the 
initial research process, a new line of 
thinking surfaced and a number of 
reoccurring themes began to emerge from 
the empirical data in relation to the 
influence of modernization on the policy-
making processes of Athletics Canada.  
Athletics Canada is the national 
governing body for track and field athletics. 
Originally established in 1884, the not-for-
profit organization is one of Canada’s oldest 
NSO (Athletics Canada, n.d.b) and at the 
time of data collection generated 
approximately CAD$6 million in revenue 
per annum (e.g., CAD$6, 019,761 in 2010; 
Athletics Canada, 2010). Like many NSOs 
in Canada, Athletics Canada relies heavily 
upon government funding. Of particular 
note, Athletics Canada has seen a threefold 
increase in government funding over the 
past 10 years; compare for example Beijing 
(i.e., CAD$3,151,000) and London (i.e., 
CAD$10,234,500) quadrennials (OTP, 
n.d.b). Athletics Canada’s headquarters is 
based in Ottawa and employs 15 full-time 
staff (at the time of data collection) with the 
mission to “provide leadership, 
development and competition that ensures 
world-level performance in athletics” 
(Athletics Canada, n.d.c). Although centrally 
coordinated by Athletics Canada, the 
delivery system of the sport in the country 
relies heavily upon its ten provincial and 
two territorial branches. These branches 
oversee their respective jurisdictions, a 
majority of grass roots programs, as well as 
the early development of athletes. This 
decentralized system of delivery typifies the 
federated delivery system of Canadian sport 
(Thibault & Harvey, 2013). With regard to 
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the delivery of elite programs, at the time of 
data collection Athletics Canada operated 
four, discipline-specific, national high 
performance training centers across the 
country. The centers are located in Victoria 
(middle distance running), Kamloops 
(throws), Ottawa/Toronto (sprints and 




Case Study Approach 
A holistic, single-case study design (Yin, 
1994) was adopted to examine the policy-
making processes of Athletics Canada. 
Rossman and Rallis (2003) defined case 
studies as “in-depth and detailed 
explorations of single examples (an event, 
process, organization, group, or individual) 
that are an instance drawn from a class of 
similar phenomena” (p. 104). Within case 
study research, emphasis is placed on 
developing thick description (Geertz, 1973) 
of highly complex and contemporary 
phenomena (typically within their real-life 
context; Yin, 1994). The utility of this 
approach lies in its ability to incorporate 
multiple data sources (Bryman, 2008; Yin, 
1994) and is particularly useful in 
developing theoretical accounts (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Einsenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Thus 
the (often misunderstood) intention of 
adopting a case study approach hereafter is 
to analytically generalize rather than 
statistically generalize (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 
1994) in that this approach provides the 
opportunity to expand and generate theory 
rather than to simply enumerate 
frequencies.  
 
Sampling and Procedure 
As a part of the case study, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 
senior Athletics Canada personnel. 
Informants were selected primarily based on 
two criteria: current or former employment 
in the organization and specific 
(unparalleled) knowledge of Athletics 
Canada policy-making processes (Gratton & 
Jones, 2010). More specifically, informants 
were selected due to their knowledge in one 
(or more) of nine policy areas as identified 
in the SPLISS conceptual framework (for a 
detailed overview of these policy areas see 
De Bosscher et al., 2006). The individuals 
selected for interview were either part-time 
or full-time employees involved in the core 
business or technical operations of the 
organization. The eight interviewees were 
between 27 and 55 years of age and 
generally had 10 or more years of 
experience in the sport sector.  
Interview guides were extracted from 
the SPLISS Athletics research consortium 
policy inventory (Truyens et al., 2014). Of 
the nine conducted interviews (one 
informant was interviewed twice, with each 
interview addressing unique policy-making 
processes), five were carried out face-to-face 
and took place at Athletics Canada’s head 
office in Ottawa, Ontario and a high 
performance training camp in Phoenix, 
Arizona and four were conducted using the 
online communication program Skype. All 
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interviews were conducted by the first 
author between December 2010 and March 
2011, ranged from 38 and 150 minutes in 
length, and were digitally recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. These transcripts 
produced 410 double-spaced pages of data 
for further analysis. 
 
Understanding the Modernization of 
Athletics Canada’s Policy-Making 
Processes  
The work of Green and Houlihan 
(2005) was drawn upon as a baseline 
comparison to examine how Athletics 
Canada’s policy-making processes had 
changed over time (i.e. between 2002-2012). 
In particular, Green and Houlihan’s (2005) 
study provided a detailed examination of 
internal policy developments and major 
issues faced by Athletics Canada at the turn 
of the century (for further insight see Green 
& Houlihan, 2005, pp. 110-121). In 
addition, Green and Houlihan (2005) 
developed a conceptual framework that 
considered four areas of elite sport policy: 
facilities; full-time athletes; coaching, sport 
science, and sport medicine; and 
competition opportunities. Green and 
Houlihan then applied this framework to 
compare the development of several elite 
sport organizations and systems (see Green 
& Houlihan, 2005; Houlihan & Green, 
2008). For purposes of our present analysis, 
the work of Green and Houlihan (2005) 
provided a means to examine the 
development of Athletics Canada policy-
making processes and allowed for a 
comparison of the substance and salience of 
prior policies to those established after the 
inception of OTP. More practically, 
however, Green and Houlihan’s (2005) 
work on Athletics Canada also provided a 
useful framework by which to reduce the 
large amount of data collected as a part of 
the original SPLISS Athletics study. See 
Table 1 for an overview of Green and 
Houlihan (2005) and the SPLISS model (De 
Bosscher et al., 2006).  
 
Coding 
The primary author undertook a 
process of independent open coding 
(Patton, 2002), specifically looking for any 
policy areas mentioned within Green and 
Houlihan’s (2005) Athletics Canada case 
study. As a result of this process, a total of 
24 specific policy areas were identified (see 
Table 2). These 24 policy areas were 
translated into codes and deductively 
applied to the analysis of transcripts. As to 
not limit analysis, the transcripts were also 
analyzed inductively, leaving open the 
opportunity for identifying new and 
emerging codes (i.e., policy areas). Allowing 
for the emergence of such codes was 
necessary given that some policy areas were 
either omitted by Green and Houlihan 
(2005) (e.g., those regarding the school 
system and talent identification) or not 
present at the time the initial study (e.g., 
those regarding the Long Term Athlete 
Development Model (LTAD) or National 
Training Centres). As a result of this 
process, a total of 41 policy areas/codes 
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were identified. It was from these policy 
areas/first order codes that second order 
codes were derived. The second order codes 
were then collapsed into three broad, inter-
related themes: (i) The development and 
prioritization of OTP-funded policy-making 
processes (ii), the development and 
prioritization of evidence-based policies and 
programs, and (iii) the further straining of 
inter-organizational relationships.    
 
Results 
(i) Development and Prioritization of 
OTP-Funded Policies and Programs 
Following the creation of OTP in 2004, 
Athletics Canada has developed and 
prioritized a number of OTP-funded 
policies and programs. In particular, the 
organization has utilized OTP funds over 
the past decade to develop and enhance 
athlete and coach development, as well as 
sport science and medicine programs. In an 
effort to enhance athlete development, for 
example, Athletics Canada established the 
Olympic Development Program (ODP) in 
2011. The program was created in response 
to what many respondents described as a set 
of historically inadequate talent 
identification and development procedures. 
As part of the program, and at the time of 
data collection, Athletics Canada provided 
support to three tiers of athletes: Tier II 
athletes, those that achieved a minimum 
(internally set) performance standard, 
received both formal recognition and 
limited support (e.g., yearly planning and 
competition scheduling); Tier I athletes, 
those that achieved a comparatively greater 
performance standard, received increased 
support (e.g., partial funding, and access to 
training camps); and 2016 group athletes, 
those that ranked top eight in the world in a 
particular sport, received a full range of 
support (e.g., financing for both the athlete 
and the coach to attend training camps and 
competitions). 
As Athletics Canada directed funding to 
high performance athletes, it simultaneously 
redirected funding from athletes elsewhere 
along the development pathway. Chiefly 
affected in this regard was Run Jump 
Throw, the organization’s grassroots, 
participation-based program: 
When we started with Run Jump Throw 
five or six years ago, the funding model 
was similar, but not quite as targeted, 
and there was more money available 
from Sport Canada for development. At 
one time, Run Jump Throw had an 
operating budget of over $200,000, 
because there was a large licensing 
agreement that was struck with the 
Hershey Company, for over three or 
four years, and we were receiving over 
$100,000/year from Sport Canada. And 
in the last couple of years, Sport Canada 
dollars have been decreased 
significantly, to about half. Also, the 
deal with Hershey’s was re-negotiated 
and there was less money there… And 
right now, if we were to say, ‘Hey, let’s 
start our grassroots development 
programs,’ it’d be a lot more difficult 
than it was five years ago because the 
Journal of Amateur Sport Volume One, Issue One    Dowling et al., 2015 87 
funding model has changed. 
(Respondent Four, 02/25/11) 
Addressing the development-related issues 
that resulted from change to the 
aforementioned funding model was 
Respondent Eight:  
I hear about it every year, from angry 
coaches, athletes, and parents, who say, 
‘How is it that my son or daughter, as 
an athlete, has to pay to represent 
Canada?’ I wish I had a better answer 
for them. We just don’t have the 
resources to be able to do it, and we’re 
in a system where those resources are 
attached to strings. ‘We have a bunch of 
money that we want to give you, but it 
can only go into this pot. You can’t take 
from us to help all those people.’ And I 
understand targeting, and focus, but I 
just wish that there was more of an 
understanding of the long term 
development of an athlete…. I mean, 
there’s a long road before they get to be 
top eight in the world, and we need to 
find a way to fund that. This is really 
important, what Own the Podium is 
doing, but we need to find a way to help 
them along that path before they get 
there. We have this short term need to 
win medals at the next [event], and we 
forget to have a longer perspective for 
2016 and 2020 (02/04/11) 
As the above quotation intimates, the 
consequences resulting from the adopted 
funding strategy extended to the 
organization’s ability to support athletes in a 
manner consistent with the Sport Canada-
mandated sport-specific LTAD plan. 
Athletics Canada, as such, became 
embroiled in a strategic dilemma in whether 
to enhance development opportunities for 
high performance athletes in accordance 
with the mandate of OTP on the one hand, 
or enhance development opportunities for 
all in accordance with the mandate more 
consistent with Sport Canada’s LTAD on 
the other. Over the period of this study, the 
organization’s focus lay in the former and 
not the latter.    
The development and prioritization of 
OTP-funded policies and programs was also 
evident in Athletics Canada’s development 
of high performance coaches. This 
development can be traced back to the 
creation of a coaching development 
position within Athletics Canada in 2006. 
Prior to the creation of this position, 
Athletics Canada had not assigned any 
individual the responsibility of overseeing 
the development and education of relevant 
coaches. The appointed manager, 
responding to both the potential for 
melioration and a set of sport-wide 
recommendations provided by the Canadian 
National Coaching Certification Council, 
subsequently restructured Athletics 
Canada’s coaching development system. 
The restructured system, simply titled the 
New Athletics Canada National Coaching 
Certification Program (NCCP), differed 
from its predecessor in several regards, 
most apparently in relation to curriculum 
design and certification. The previous 
curriculum design comprised of five levels, 
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each with three components (theory, 
technical, and practical), whereas the new 
system consisted of three streams 
(representing model coaching 
environments; instruction, community, 
competition) focused on a single 
component – competency. Similarly, 
certification was once dispensed in 
accordance with the completion of a 
particular curriculum level. The new 
program reflects competency in a specific 
coaching stream and context (e.g., beginner 
instruction through to high performance). 
These and other such changes indicate a 
marked increase in the formalization of 
Athletics Canada’s coaching development 
system.  
The formalized system, despite 
accounting for an entire spectrum of 
coaches, facilitated a narrowing of the 
organization’s orientation and domain. This 
was evidenced through the development 
and prioritization of a refined high 
performance coaching development 
program (reflective of one of six new 
certification contexts). The program, 
targeted in scope and available only to a 
select few participants, was developed in 
such a manner as to align with the agenda of 
OTP, and, as a consequence, better ensure 
the continued receipt of financial support. 
The distribution of such support by 
Athletics Canada, was not, however, 
inclusive; instead, it reinforced the 
increasingly salient high performance 
agenda. In discussing the organization’s 
provision of support to various streams and 
contexts/programs, Respondent Four 
stated: 
Athletics Canada oversees… all of the 
coach education programs in the 
country, from Run Jump Throw (the 
sole program for both the instruction 
and community streams), which is a 
grassroots program, right through to 
high performance. The actual delivery of 
the Run Jump Throw and grassroots 
programs is the responsibility of the 
[provincial] branches. We take over as 
the primary provider of competition 
development and higher, so developing 
high performance and elite coaching 
education…. At Level Three, the new 
competition development (the 
introductory program in the competition 
stream), we don’t really support them 
other than by providing opportunities 
for education. It’s really the branches 
that fund them. They pay for it so there’s 
not necessarily a lot of support there for 
them… We’re working on determining 
our policy of how competition 
development advanced coaches (the 
mediate program in the competition 
stream) will be supported… And then at 
Level Five, the OTP level (the high 
performance program in the competition 
stream), we develop an individual 
learning plan and apply for funding, and 
when we’re successful, those 
opportunities are fully funded through 
Athletics Canada/OTP. (02/25/11) 
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The quotation indirectly highlights the 
disparate levels of support that Athletics 
Canada had provided to its various coaching 
development programs. The sole program 
for both the instruction and community 
streams, despite a sound infrastructure (e.g., 
set of policies), operated almost exclusively 
outside the purview of the organization. In 
contrast, the introductory and mediate 
programs in the competition stream lacked 
both policies and financing. The high 
performance program in the competition 
stream, finally, received both significant 
administrative and financial support. 
Athletics Canada, then, has, as it did with 
athlete support, prioritized high 
performance coaches at the expense of their 
sub-elite equivalents and grassroots 
participants.  
The abovementioned issues, pertaining 
to domain (i.e., areas of service provision), 
were exacerbated by the organization’s 
increased development and prioritization of 
sport science and medicine programs. The 
sport science program, for example, was 
enhanced through equipment (e.g., shoe, 
bodysuit) design interventions, the 
accumulation of “competitive intelligence” 
(i.e., information pertaining to other 
countries’ developmental and competitive 
practices), and the engagement in, and 
incorporation of, biomechanical research. 
Responsible, in part, for the 
communications of conducted research 
were clinicians appointed to the 
organization’s expanded sport medicine 
program. This program differed from its 
earlier counterparts in that it featured an 
integrated support team (consisting of 
various clinicians), employed preventative 
(rather than reactive) care and science, and 
introduced a new set of performance-related 
tests and analyses. 
These measures, as well as those 
associated with the sport science program, 
were considered as integral not only to the 
organization’s pursuit of sporting 
excellence, but also to retaining the financial 
and administrative support of OTP. 
Affirming the organization’s increased 
prioritization of sport science and medicine 
programs, and speaking to the related 
developmental role of OTP, was 
Respondent One: 
We expect to see a sport science and 
sport medicine program as part of 
application, and it better be something 
that’s real, something that you’re using, 
something that’s evolving, and 
something that has impact. Would we 
have done it without [the support of 
OTP]? Yeah. But would we have been 
as compelled, or as organized, or as well 
resourced? No. So this really helped. 
Own the Podium is very good. They 
[OTP] push us a bit, but they pull us 
along, and they accompany us at the 
same time. They’re really, really good 
partners. (02/26/11)  
The organization’s sport science and 
medicine programs, as such, reinforced the 
pursuit of a high performance mandate. It is 
worth noting as well that although these 
programs resulted in positive consequences 
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for less elite athlete groups, these groups 
were seldom the intended beneficiaries. As 
Respondent One, in addressing a question 
of OTP funding criteria and finance 
disbursement, remarked: 
The criteria are, ‘Will they impact 
podium performance at a major games?’ 
That’s the starting and ending point, 
quite frankly… Well, there always is an 
element of, ‘How will this impact future 
performances? Does this have a broad 
enough application that it can be 
brought to the sport as a whole, and not 
just the elite level in this particular 
timeframe?’ The work we’re doing right 
now in the relay exchange area is 
something that will have a broad 
application to all of our relay teams; 
whether they’re a youth or junior team, it 
would refine our relay protocols to a 
smaller or greater degree… Some of 
them would parlay into greater system 
change, better system thinking, but quite 
a bit of it would be individual athlete 
specific. (02/26/11) 
The assumption being made by the 
respondent here, and the assumption of the 
organization’s development and 
prioritization of high performance-related 
policy-making processes more generally, is 
that the development of elite athlete and 
coach programs (in line with the mandate of 
OTP) will, in turn, have knock-on or ‘spill-
over’ effects on those further down the 
delivery system.  
 
 (ii) Development and Prioritization of 
Evidence-Based Policies and Programs 
As Athletics Canada became further 
aligned with OTP’s high performance 
objectives, it has also began to develop and 
prioritize a set of related, evidence-based 
policy-making processes. Developments in 
relation to Athletics Canada specifically 
involved the increased incorporation and 
employment of objective performance 
measures. The use of such measures was 
integral to the organization not only in 
projecting a form of accountability and 
responsiveness to the leading national sport 
agencies (e.g., Sport Canada, Canadian 
Olympic Committee, and Own the 
Podium), but also in determining the 
manners and streams in which the agencies’ 
financing would be utilized. Addressing the 
interrelationship between the employment 
of objective measures (i.e., “evidence”) and 
the organization’s financing of particular 
high performance sport streams was 
Respondent Five:  
Every decision we’re taking, when we’re 
putting the blocks of our strategic plan 
in the high performance area, we need 
to have evidence…. And we had 
enough evidence in terms of long 
distance running and race walking to say 
that we just don’t have the athletes…. 
Again, it all goes back to, ‘We need to 
have evidence to decide what to do. We 
cannot just go on impression.’ 
(02/04/11) 
For Athletics Canada, then, decisions 
pertaining to high performance sport 
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became increasingly tied to measurable 
results. 
 Nowhere was this increasingly evidence-
based approach to decision-making more 
apparent than in an organizational policy 
that pertained to the country’s Athlete 
Assistance Program (AAP). Developed and 
managed by Sport Canada, the program 
supports select athletes through the 
provision of living, training allowances, and 
academic scholarships (Athletics Canada, 
n.d.a). Athletics Canada’s role in this 
program is the identification and selection 
of eligible, sport-specific beneficiaries 
(colloquially referred to as ‘card recipients’) 
who can then be recommended to Sport 
Canada. It is in this regard that the 
organization has increased its incorporation 
and employment of objective performance 
measures. Describing in detail the manner in 
which the organization’s AAP policy has 
been revised was Respondent Eight: 
… The way the criteria (for selecting 
beneficiaries) were done and written 
was not clear. It was not objective 
enough in the minds of the people who 
were out there… So at that time (2005), 
I gathered as much information as I 
could from people, and I created a 
point system which ranked athletes…. 
There were different categories, and a 
part of it was training, coaching 
environment, but then there was also 
how you did at nationals (national 
events), how you did at international 
events, what your top three 
performances averaged out to, and 
those types of things. And it worked in 
terms of being defendable, defensible, 
objective, and clear to people 
(02/04/11) 
Although Athletics Canada’s AAP policy 
was subsequently revised to what one 
respondent referred to as “something that’s 
a little more subjective” (Respondent Eight, 
02/04/11), it retained a far more stringent 
set of criteria than any of its pre-2002 
equivalents. The evidence-based policy thus 
reinforced the newly adopted organizational 
value of objective and evidence-based 
decision-making.  
The impact of the revised policy’s 
formality was also particularly evident in the 
organization’s talent identification and 
athlete development procedures. Prior to 
the policy’s revision, these procedures were 
generally lacking in stringent guidelines and 
criteria for identifying and segmenting elite 
athletes. The same, however, could not be 
said for these procedures following the 
policy’s revision. Retracing the development 
of these procedures and the related impact 
of the revised AAP policy (i.e., “criteria,” 
“carding streams”) was Respondent Two:  
What I believe is that we worked very 
hard in creating our high performance 
structure, and setting out all the 
strategies, and criteria, and very specific 
goals of top eight at podium, and that 
the development part was not matching 
it; it was just something out there, with 
no rhyme or reason, that needed to be 
organized more and aligned with 
everything that we were doing.... We 
Journal of Amateur Sport Volume One, Issue One    Dowling et al., 2015 92 
had no direction before. And we had no 
criteria proof that we had talent... 
Sometimes we got suckered into being 
convinced that we had talent. Now, 
because everything is aligned with the 
carding streams, and everything is 
directed through top eight, we can 
actually confidently say, ‘This is some 
serious talent. This talent is staying on 
stream. It’s showing all the signs, and 
we know we can put some effort and 
money in to that.’ (02/26/11) 
In aligning talent identification and athlete 
development procedures with the revised 
AAP policy, Athletics Canada was ultimately 
able to set in place the framework for the 
previously described Olympic Development 
Program (ODP). It was also suggested, by at 
least one respondent, that this alignment 
could ease the process by which the 
organization narrowed its domain (from one 
that emphasized high performance sport in 
general to one that emphasized a select few 
high performance sport sub-disciplines, e.g., 
sprint, middle distance, and relay track 
events). The development of high 
performance-related, evidence-based policy-
making processes thus included the 
formalization of a beneficiary plan, the 
creation of the ODP, and may yet still result 
in the narrowing of focus to support select 
high performance sport disciplines.  
Athletics Canada’s development and 
prioritization of evidence-based, high 
performance-related policy-making 
processes was apparent not only in the 
above examples, but also in the 
organization’s decreased support of its Run 
Jump Throw program. The program was 
originally assembled some 20 years ago in an 
effort to enhance the physical fitness, 
health, and maturation of Canadian children 
six to twelve years of age. Despite its 
longevity and merits, the program as 
historically lacked a catalogue of objective 
performance measures (e.g., rates of 
continued participation, club memberships 
resulting from program participation). It 
was as a result of this decreased support 
that the program saw reductions in both 
funding and responsible personnel, with its 
implementation increasingly outsourced to 
provincial and territorial branches. Short of 
any intervention, the established future 
trajectory of the program is unlikely to 
experience any significant alteration. The 
fate of Run Jump Throw, as such, can 
therefore be viewed as emblematic of 
Athletics Canada’s increased development 
and prioritization of high performance-
related, evidence-based policy-making 
processes.  
 
(iii) Strained Inter-organizational 
Relationships 
As illustrated by the above example of 
continued outsourcing of the Run Jump 
Throw program, the narrowing of Athletics 
Canada strategic focus has also had 
consequences that extended beyond the 
operations of the organization. This was 
particularly evident through Athletic 
Canada’s attempts to create a strategic plan 
that incorporated provincial and territorial 
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branches. Also affected by this plan were 
local clubs and Canadian interuniversity 
athletic programs. For Athletics Canada, the 
advancement of its high performance 
agenda necessitated the introduction of a 
strategic plan that incorporated both 
provincial and territorial branches. It can be 
argued that the particular grounds for such a 
plan stemmed from a disconnect in 
organizational domains: whereas the 
national organization increasingly valued 
those programs and activities that supported 
high performance sport, some provincial 
and territorial branches valued those 
programs and activities that encouraged 
general participation. The concern for 
Athletics Canada, then, was how to align all 
provincial and territorial branches with a 
high performance feeder system. According 
to one respondent, Athletics Canada initially 
attempted to achieve alignment through the 
use of individual, province-by-
province/territory-by-territory 
memorandums of understanding. When 
these attempts failed, the organization 
sought to develop, with the assistance of 
individual branches, a singular, cohesive 
plan. One respondent’s optimism relating to 
the prospects of implementing this plan 
were, however, rather limited:  
It’s going to be challenging. It’s going to 
be challenging because… (searching for 
the words). The reality is that the 
members (provincial/territorial 
branches) don’t have the capacity to 
work on these kinds of things. It’s 
always the same people doing the same 
kind of things, so sometimes they 
cannot [commit] time to that. And 
secondly, they are so - They’re trying to 
survive, in some cases, and so for them 
to do these kind of things is not a 
priority, because they have other things 
to do rather than trying to align. And 
also, some have a tough time 
understanding what we’re doing at the 
high performance level. (Respondent 
Five, 02/04/11) 
Impediments relating to the implementation 
of the plan were therefore numerous; 
included among these were a disconnected 
set of organizational domains and 
orientations, as well as a limited amount of 
organizational capacity. The variance in 
organizational values ultimately undermined 
any potential for compromise, with a select 
few respondents suggesting that this had led 
to an increasingly strained relationship 
between the involved parties. 
Local clubs, much like provincial and 
territorial branches, were also expected to 
be aligned with a high performance feeder 
system. In some respects, Athletics Canada 
achieved this end. Talent identification 
efforts at the level of local clubs were 
increased, and identified athletes were 
regularly moved into one of several national 
training centres. According to some 
respondents, the interventions on the part 
of Athletics Canada to move athletes to 
nationally recognized training centres, were 
not, however, always well received by local 
club managers or coaches. For some 
coaches, intervention primarily resulted in a 
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diminished sense of autonomy (local club 
managers and coaches no longer held the 
exclusive responsibility of identifying and 
developing elite junior athletes, but rather 
had to share this responsibility with 
Athletics Canada and national training 
centre personnel). This matter was further 
complicated as Athletics Canada had not 
endeavoured to garner the explicit 
cooperation of club personnel. The 
cumulative effect of these actions was, 
according to Respondent 2, the creation of 
a distrusting relationship, one that required 
the attention of Athletics Canada:  
Early on, at the age of 17, the biggest 
role for Athletics Canada is to create 
relationships with those clubs and 
coaches - to create a trusting 
communication relationship - and to [let 
them know] that, ‘I am not here to steal 
your athlete. I’m recognizing that 
you’ve done something very positive, 
and let me help you to continue to 
ensure that that athlete stays on that 
high performance stream’…. The one 
thing that we’re struggling with is 
getting those clubs to realize that they 
have maxed out on what they can offer 
an athlete, and when it is time to 
consider either creating a relationship 
with a national association, or a national 
event group, or moving an athlete to a 
[national training] centre, and that’s a 
piece that Canada seems to not like. 
They don’t really want to go there. And 
the only way I think that we can 
convince people is that we start 
showing some success, in the centres. 
And because the centre concept is so 
new it’s going to take time. (02/26/11) 
For this Athletics Canada employee, then, 
NSO intervention to move athletes to 
nationally recognized training centres in the 
operation of local clubs, despite any 
resultant benefits (e.g., improved athlete 
training opportunities, decreased club 
expenditures), led to strained 
interorganizational relationships. 
The final group of organizations 
expected to be aligned with a high 
performance feeder system was to come 
from Canadian Interuniversity Sport. The 
alignment of interuniversity sport programs 
was particularly integral to Athletics Canada 
for two primary reasons: the provision of 
proximate and meaningful training 
opportunities, and the availability of support 
(e.g., educational and expert resources) for 
athlete retention efforts. Athletics Canada, 
however, experienced difficulties in their 
relationships with these programs. 
Addressing these difficulties, as well as the 
need for related amelioration, was, again, 
Respondent Two: 
The relationship, and I don’t 
understand why, has been strained. And 
I think primarily just because the 
universities have one major focus, on 
the indoor season, and we have our 
focus, on the outdoor season. I don’t 
understand. There’s a whole bunch of 
history. But I see - for recruiting, 
retention, and talent development - that 
has to become a stronger relationship, 
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because they are taking the athletes in 
the first half of my ODP program. So 
it’s a weakness right now that I’m 
desperately trying to sort out. 
(02/26/11) 
The response from Canadian interuniversity 
athletic programs, to Athletics Canada’s 
intervention, was therefore similar to those 
that came from provincial/territorial 
branches and local clubs. In each example, 
the strategic plan presented a novel set of 
organizational values, challenged existent 
modes of operation, and threatened to 
reduce levels of autonomy. Given such 
conditions, it should not be surprising that 
the advancement of a high performance 
agenda resulted in several strained 
interorganizational relationships.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This article examined the consequences 
of modernization on the policy-making 
processes of a singular NSO: Athletics 
Canada. In drawing upon the works of 
Green and Houlihan (2005) as a baseline 
comparison, this article provided a 
descriptive case study analysis of how the 
policy-making processes of an NSO have 
changed over a 10-year period (2002-2012). 
The above analysis brings to the forefront a 
number of key points of discussion that can 
be can be drawn out from the research 
findings. First and foremost, consistent with 
previous modernization-related works 
(Adams, 2011; Green & Houlihan, 2005, 
2006; Grix, 2009; Grix & Parker, 2011; 
Houlihan & Green, 2009), it is evident that 
many of the developments that have 
occurred within Athletics Canada over the 
past decade have been governmental-driven, 
high performance focused, and increasingly 
evidence-based. Furthermore, the programs 
and policies that have seen the most 
development (i.e. have been prioritized) by 
Athletics Canada, have primarily been those 
that are heavily supported and facilitated by 
OTP. In particular, programs that have seen 
most support in recent years have been 
those surrounding high performance athlete 
support (e.g., sport science and medicine 
programs) and athlete and development 
(e.g., the ODP and AAP carding criteria). 
It also apparent, from our data at least, 
that the nurturing and development of high 
performance related and OTP-driven 
programs and policies has often come at the 
expense or at least reduced support of other 
wider-social and participation based 
programs. This finding was emblematic in 
the above discussions surrounding the 
decreased support of the Run Jump Throw 
program since the mid-2000s. More broadly, 
then, our empirical case study of Athletics 
Canada lends support for Green and 
Houlihan’s (2005) viewpoint that mass and 
elite objectives are fundamentally not 
compatible. As Green and Houlihan (2005) 
conclude in their seminal study of sport 
policy change, “it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that elite sport development and 
achievement on the one hand and mass 
participation and club development on the 
other are deeply incompatible functions 
within the policy frameworks current in 
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Australia, Canada and the UK” (p. 189). 
Our case study supports Green and 
Houlihan’s (2005) notion of incompatibility 
in that we revealed a number of specific 
examples of decision-making (e.g., the 
ODP, RJT, and AAP carding) whereby 
Athletics Canada has had to prioritize the 
pursuit of high performance sport at the 
expense of participation-based objectives. 
Furthermore, these incompatibilities were 
also evident within the requirements 
imposed by Canada’s two lead governing 
agencies themselves. To provide an 
example, there is a clear dilemma for 
Athletics Canada to achieve the short-term, 
medal driven targets set by Own the 
Podium on the one hand, versus Sport 
Canada’s requirement to adopt and 
implement the long-term, holistic LTAD 
model approach on the other.  
Perhaps one of the more pertinent 
findings of our case study analysis of 
Athletics Canada, and closely linked to the 
above discussion regarding the development 
of select policies and programs, is further 
evidence to support the notion that the 
decision-making capabilities of the 
organization are heavily constrained by its 
governmental agency funding dependencies 
(namely Own the Podium and Sport 
Canada). These funding dependencies, in 
turn, effectively ensure that allocation of 
public funding comes with ‘strings attached’ 
to ensure that taxpayers funding is well 
spent (Green & Houlihan, 2005). As Grix 
(2009) notes in his analysis of UK Athletics 
(UKA), “the hierarchical chain of power 
from government down to NGBs [NSOs] 
has effectively strait-jacketed UKA into 
delivering a narrow, Olympic-driven sports 
policy to meet government set targets, 
which leaves little time and resources to 
address the factors behind the sports’ 
general decline” (p. 46). Similarly, our 
analysis of Athletics Canada suggests that 
the organization is now operating under 
heavy constraint – most apparently by Own 
the Podium – to focus on and deliver short, 
term, Olympic-medal success. As such, 
many of the decisions by Athletics Canada 
professional staff since the turn of the 
century can be viewed as attempts to ensure 
compliance with its funding partners and 
ultimately to ensure the organizations’ 
survival. In brief, Athletics Canada’s 
decision-making capabilities are very much 
constrained within the ‘rules of the game’ 
currently dictated by federal government 
(via Own the Podium and Sport Canada) 
(Green & Houlihan, 2006).  
What can also be drawn from the above 
review are the apparent similarities of the 
characteristics of reform evident within 
Athletics Canada compared to those 
experienced by UK Athletics (as reported by 
Grix, 2009). It is apparent from our analysis 
that both organizations have undergone 
strikingly similar reforms since the turn of 
the century. To provide examples of a few 
instances: 
• Both organizations (UK Athletics 
and Athletics Canada) have been 
the subject of organizational 
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reform and key personnel 
turnover; 
• Both organizations have 
undergone a narrowing of their 
strategic focus – specifically to 
Olympic-driven medal success; 
• Due to funding and resource 
constraints, both organizations are 
increasingly adopting a more 
strategic approach in terms of 
athletes and sub-discipline 
investment;  
• Both organizations exhibit a shift 
in accountability away from its 
members and clubs (i.e. grassroots 
stakeholders) and upwards towards 
governmental agencies (via Own 
the Podium and Sport Canada);  
• Both organizations have 
increasingly adopted an evidence-
based (i.e. ‘New Managerial’) 
approach to their policy/decision-
making processes. 
One notable difference between our analysis 
of Athletics Canada and Grix’s (2009) 
analysis within the UK equivalent NSO, 
however, is that UKA and English Athletics 
specifically have been able to set key 
performance indicators between itself and 
its regional branches. As Grix (2009) notes, 
“English Athletics, for example sets some 
130 KPIs to be met by its regional 
branches” (p. 40). In contrast, Athletics 
Canada has been unable to impose such 
targets on its member branches to date. 
This can in part, be explained by Canada’s 
multi-level, federalist sport system (Thibault 
& Harvey, 2013) and the relative 
independence of the provincial/territorial 
branches compared to the UK.   
The latter part of our review (i.e. 
discussions surrounding inter-organizational 
strain) bring to the forefront what Sam 
(2009) described as the ‘wicked nature’ of 
sport policy, particularly as they relate to the 
modernization of NSOs. Specifically, 
Athletics Canada’s inability to formulate and 
agree-upon coherent development pathway 
plans with its provincial/territorial 
branches, the growing lack of trust between 
Athletics Canada and clubs, and the strained 
relationship between Athletics Canada and 
the CIS can all collectively be viewed as the 
‘unintended consequences’ (i.e. product) of 
an NSO seeking to develop partnerships 
under the assumptions of a managerialist 
logic. For Sam (2009), 
“given the resounding justification for 
the modernizing agenda is for NSOs to 
be better attuned to the needs and 
demands of stakeholders, it remains to 
be seen whether more modern and 
commercialized practices will indeed 
raise their capacities to do so” (p. 510).  
From the data collected, it seems apparent 
that the modernization of Athletics Canada 
is shifting the organizations’ focus up to 
governmental agencies and away from the 
needs and demands of its stakeholders 
further down the delivery chain. The 
concern here, is the production of a 
‘democratic deficit’ (Houlihan & Green, 
2009) whereby decision-making in relation 
to the development of the sport is made 
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top-down rather than bottom-up and often 
at the expense or marginalization of certain 
stakeholders and groups.  
In turning to the contributions of our 
case study analysis to the literature, this 
investigation explored further the 
consequences of modernization within the 
Canadian sport context. More specifically, 
our analysis built upon the works of Green 
and Houlihan (2005) to examine the 
consequences of modernization over a ten 
year period (2002-2012), and in doing so, 
contributes an in-depth empirical case study 
to the small but growing body of literature 
that has examined the reforms of amateur 
sport organizations in recent years (e.g., 
Adams, 2011; Grix, 2009; Houlihan & 
Green, 2009; Sam, 2009, 2011). In relation 
to limitations and directions for future 
research, it is acknowledged that this 
investigation did not originally set out to 
study the consequences of NSO reform. 
Future studies should therefore be 
constructed specifically to do so. 
Furthermore, the analysis was 
methodologically limited in that it only 
considered one organization. Future 
research could therefore expand the 
empirical site to include more NSOs 
(although valuable work has already been 
done here, cf Kikulis et al., 1992; Green & 
Houlihan, 2005), and to examine the 
influence of modernization on sports 
organizations further down the delivery 
system (i.e., provincial/ territorial branches 
and clubs). Finally, this research highlighted 
the continued and notable role that OTP is 
playing in terms of modernizing NSOs 
within the Canadian sporting context. It is 
evident from our case study of Athletics 
Canada that OTP is now a key driving force 
for the modernisation agenda evident within 
Canada and more needs to be done to 
understand how this nascent organization is 
influencing the Canadian sporting 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Comparative Elite Sport Policy Model Factors 
 
Table 2 
Extracted Athletics Canada Themes from Green & Houlihan (2005) 
Development of Elite Level 
Facilities  
Emergence of ‘full time’ 
Athletes  
Developments in Coaching, 
Sport Science & Medicine 
Competition Opportunities 
for Elite Athletes  
a. No National 
Strategic Facility Plan 
e. Athlete going to US 
+ over reliance on 
AAP  
j. Few ‘Full-Time’ 
Coaches Employed 
r. Variance in 
Competition at all 
levels  
b. Public Perception of 
Athletics 
f. Non-Eligibility of 
AAP for NCAA 
Canadians 






Sponsorship Volatility   
g. ACs Ambiguity 
Over ‘Full-Time’ 
Athletes 
l. Key Hires as a 
Significant Change of 
Ethos  
t. Low Levels of 
Domestic Competition  
d. ACs ambiguous 
attitude towards CSCs 
h. AC struggling with 
low federal funding 
m. Volunteer Ethos 
Prevalence  
u. Suitable 
Competition for Elite 
Athletes issue 
 i. Restricted Athlete 
funding to AAP 
n. Christie Report 
(2001) as a Catalyst  
v. Competing 
Competition Schedules  
  o. Sport Science 
Legitimization in 1988  
w. Elite + Sub-Elite 
Competition divide 
  p. Sport Science 
Problematic for AC 
x. No Comprehensive 
Competition Structure  
  q. Sport Science 
Internally Developed 
y. AC emerging from a 
Policy Void 
 
Green & Houlihan (2005) De Bosscher et al. (2006) 
 
1. Development of Elite Facilities  
 
2. Emergence of ‘Full-Time’ Athletes 
 
3. Developments in Coaching, Sport Science & 
Medicine 
 
4. Competition Opportunities for Elite Athletes 
1. Financial Support 
2. Policy Development 
3. Participation 
4. Talent ID and Development 
5. Athletic & Post-Career Support 
6. Training Facilities 
7. Coaching Provision & Coach Development 
8. (Inter)national Competition 
9. Scientific Research 
